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For a long time interest in the sense of agency was confined to a small group of researchers such
as philosophers of mind concerned with fundamental questions of consciousness and free will or
neuropsychologists investigating mental illnesses that clearly involve abnormalities of agency (e.g.,
psychosis). This niche existence obscured the concept’s relevance for many societal and cultural
phenomena in which individuals experience subjective control over objectively uncontrollable
events, or neglect control over events they have caused. It also resulted in a rather small number of
scientific studies addressing the sense of agency. Today, scientific investigations of sense of agency
constitute a rapidly expanding field. This is evident in the rising number of scientific articles related
to the topic as listed on search engine databases such as PubMed.
Significant progress has been made with respect to some fundamental questions concerning the
sense of agency, for example, in shedding light on the brain regions supporting sense of agency
or in clarifying its conceptual boundaries. Yet, numerous questions remain unanswered. These
include, but are not limited to, what neural network dynamics underlie the sense of agency, how
does the sense of agency develop across the lifespan (e.g., in children compared to adults), and how
can agency research be used in more applied domains, like engineering and computer science. The
contributions in this research topic go some way to answering these questions. Here we provide a
brief overview of these contributions, focusing on general themes that have emerged.
A number of contributions add to the theoretical literature on sense of agency. Some consider
the applicability of Bayesian approaches to sense of agency (Friston et al., 2013; Moutoussis
et al., 2014), an exciting development that promises to integrate agency research within a wider
theoretical framework for understanding neurocognitive function. Other theoretical contributions
have highlighted, and attempted to overcome, problems with existing models of agency processing
(Carruthers, 2014; Chambon et al., 2014; Cioffi et al., 2014; Gentsch and Synofzik, 2014; Sowden
and Shah, 2014; Swiney and Sousa, 2014). These cover a range of issues such as the affective
dimension of agency processing (Gentsch and Synofzik, 2014) and the contribution of prospective
(pre-motor) cues to sense of agency (Chambon et al., 2014). Collectively, these contributions
demonstrate the relative maturity of theoretical work on sense of agency and how significant
progress is being made in our understanding of it. Finally, other theoretical contributions have
looked at more applied aspects of agency research, for example, the relevance of agency theory and
methods for the field of human-computer-interaction, an exciting new arena in which to explore
sense of agency (Limerick et al., 2014).
Amongst the original research articles, a large group of contributions used the so-called
Libet-clock to investigate sense of agency, with the majority focusing on the intentional binding
effect (Barlas and Obhi, 2013; Cavazzana et al., 2014; Jo et al., 2014; Penton et al., 2014;
Pfister et al., 2014; Hascalovitz and Obhi, 2015). Those contributions using intentional binding
have done so in new and exciting ways, for example to assess agency processing in children
(Cavazzana et al., 2014) and in social contexts (Pfister et al., 2014). However, intentional
binding was not the only method used in our empirical contributions and important insights
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have been gleaned from a number of different methods such
as the joint Simon effect and classical psychophysical measures
together with Bayesian modeling (Kawabe, 2013; Stenzel et al.,
2014). A particularly novel contribution used sensory attenuation
to examine agency processing during lucid dreaming, pushing
agency research into exciting new areas (Windt et al., 2014).
Additionally, a few contributions further examined the neural
underpinnings of the sense of agency in methodologically novel
and exciting ways. These have investigated the neural correlates
of sense of agency as well as the neural networks supporting
this experience (Dogge et al., 2014; Jo et al., 2014; Ritterband-
Rosenbaum et al., 2014a,b). These contributions represent a
significant advance in neuroimaging approaches to agency
processing.
The final theme we have identified in the contributions centers
around disorders of agency. These have extended the classical
example of psychosis by discussing loss of agency in apraxia,
anosognosia for hemiplegia and phantom-limb phenomena
(Imaizumi et al., 2014; Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014; Preston and
Newport, 2014). There is also an important discussion of
the utility of objective measures of sense of agency, such as
intentional binding, in helping to improve our understanding
of neurological disorders (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). From these
contributions it is becoming increasingly clear that aberrant
experiences of agency are an important feature of numerous
psychiatric and neurological disorders.
Taken together, this Research Topic demonstrates the
impressive breadth of research currently being undertaken
on sense of agency. The contributions themselves reveal the
various applications, cross-disciplinary relevance and widespread
significance of this topic. Sense of agency is now firmly on
the agenda of psychologists, philosophers, computer scientists,
neuroscientists, and neurologists/psychiatrists. However, despite
the fact that significant progress has been made in our
understanding of sense of agency and its real-world relevance,
there is much work still to be done. Indeed this research topic
serves as a record not only of where agency research is at present,
but also as an indicator of where it can go in the future.
References
Barlas, Z., and Obhi, S. (2013). Freedom, choice, and the sense of agency. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7:514. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00514
Carruthers, G. (2014). What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the
conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:434. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00434
Cavazzana, A., Begliomini, C., and Bisiacchi, P. S. (2014). Intentional binding effect
in children: insights from a new paradigm. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:651. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00651
Chambon, V., Sidarus, N., andHaggard, P. (2014). From action intentions to action
effects: how does the sense of agency come about? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:320.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00320
Cioffi, M. C., Moore, J. W., and Banissy, M. J. (2014). What can mirror-touch
synaesthesia tell us about the sense of agency? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:256. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00256
Dogge, M., Hofman, D., Boersma, M., Dijkerman, H. C., and Aarts, H. (2014).
Cortical information flow during inferences of agency. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:609. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00609
Friston, K., Schwartenbeck, P., Fitzgerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., and
Dolan, R. J. (2013). The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7:598. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598
Gentsch, A., and Synofzik, M. (2014). Affective coding: the emotional dimension
of agency. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:608. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00608
Hascalovitz, A., and Obhi, S. (2015). Personality and intentional binding: an
exploratory study using scores on the narcissistic personality inventory. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 9:609. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00013
Imaizumi, S., Asai, T., Kanayama, N., Kawamura, M., and Koyama, S. (2014).
Agency over a phantom limb and electromyographic activity on the stump
depend on visuomotor synchrony: a case study. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:545.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00545
Jo, H.-G., Wittmann, M., Hinterberger, T., and Schmidt, S. (2014). The readiness
potential reflects intentional binding. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:421. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00421
Kawabe, T. (2013). Side effect of acting on the world: acquisition of action-outcome
statistic relation alters visual interpretation of action outcome. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:610. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00610
Limerick, H., Coyle, D., and Moore, J. W. (2014). The experience of agency
in human-computer interactions: a review. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:643. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00643
Moutoussis, M., Trujillo-Barreto, N. J. P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R., and Friston,
K. (2014). A formal model of interpersonal inference. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:160. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00160
Pazzaglia, M., andGalli, G. (2014). Loss of agency in apraxia. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:751. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00751
Penton, T., Thierry, G. L., and Davis, N. J. (2014). Individual differences
in attributional style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predict
subjective estimates of action intention. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:638. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00638
Pfister, R., Obhi, S. S., Rieger, M., and Wenke, D. (2014). Action
and perception in social contexts: intentional binding for social
action effects. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:667. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00667
Preston, C., and Newport, R. (2014). Noisy visual feedback training impairs
detection of self-generated movement error: implications for anosognosia
for hemiplegia. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:456. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00456
Ritterband-Rosenbaum, A., Karabanov, A. N., Christensen, M. S., and Nielsen,
J. B. (2014a). 10Hz rTMS over right parietal cortex alters sense of
agency during self-controlled movements. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:471. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00471
Ritterband-Rosenbaum, A., Nielsen, J. B., and Christensen, M. S. (2014b).
Sense of agency is related to gamma band coupling in an inferior parietal-
preSMA circuitry. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:510. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00510
Sowden, S., and Shah, P. (2014). Self-other control: a candidate mechanism
for social cognitive function. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:789. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00789
Stenzel, A., Dolk, T., Colzato, L. S., Sellaro, R., Hommel, B., and Liepelt,
R. (2014). The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not
intentionality, of the alternative action. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:595. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00595
Swiney, L., and Sousa, P. (2014). A new comparator account of auditory
verbal hallucinations: how motor prediction can plausibly contribute to
the sense of agency for inner speech. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:675. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00675
Windt, J. M., Harkness, D. L., and Lenggenhager, B. (2014). Tickle me, I
think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and
predictive processing in lucid dreams. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:717. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00717
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 310
David et al. Sense of agency
Wolpe, N., and Rowe, J. B. (2014). Beyond the ‘urge to move’: objective measures
for the study of agency in the post-Libet era. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:450. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00450
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 David, Obhi and Moore. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 310
